Modern Day Tyranny

Tyranny was not always a bad thing, despite the modern-day connotations of the term. Even the most fearsome dinosaur commonly known to children has 'tyrant' in its name (Tyrannosaurus), but the first tyrants were merely political leaders in ancient Greek states who overthrew aristocratic governments with popular support and instituted reforms to revitalise the political and economic life of the states. Tyrants were usually aristocrats themselves, but they allied themselves with the middle and lower classes to overthrow the rule of the nobility, and so could be considered class traitors. The reason for discontent among the ruled classes was usually underrepresentation in government, since power was held by those who owned the most land and had the most wealth, poverty, and the rise of a new middle class which had aspirations to power and for reform. Hence the rule of a tyrant, called a tyranny, was probably tyrannical only to the hitherto rich aristocrats who had their lands seized, but much welcomed (at least initially) by the poor who had those lands parcelled out to them.

Some characteristics of the ancient Greek tyrannies are eerily reminiscent of the rule of populist leaders today, like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, such as (i) popularity and power base among the poor, (ii) seizing control during times of turmoil, (iii) seizing land from the rich to give to the poor, (iv) replacing a corrupt regime with promises of reform and patriotism, (v) implementing public projects ostensibly to benefit the poor. Scanning his profile on the BBC news website reveals most if not all of these traits and actions. It seems that such a leadership pattern or strategy has a long history of use; perhaps really is an effective means of achieving power.

For the ancient Greek states, tyranny was often beneficial. It replaced corrupt and deadened political oligarchies, where an elite class held most of the power, with a more democratic model and helped to restart economies through the promotion of trade and manufacturing. The latter was tied to the rise of the new middle class of tradesmen and artisans who did not fit into the traditional agrarian way of life. The wealth of this middle class was not tied to the land, and so they were not beholden to the great landowners who were the aristocrats. But because they had wealth but little political power, they were interested to see the overthrow of the aristocracy and the implementation of a new regime which would grant more influence to their class, and so through the tyrant, they achieved their aim.

However, tyranny can lead to ruin for a state, especially a modern one, in particular where populism is carried too far. In the case of Chavez's Venezuela, loyalty to the state is in some cases being subsumed by loyalty to the persona of the president. This is where the tyrant's authority overwhelms all others and is accepted unquestioningly. This can be a powerful tool in coordinating national action, yet it is a very dangerous situation where dissenting opinion is ignored or suppressed, because checks and balances against the abuse of power then fail. Chavez's dominance of the state media, his ubiquity, saturates those who cannot afford other means of finding out about the outside world, and hence moulds their world view to his. The citizen militias preparing earnestly for an 'assymmetric war' against the United States, whom Chavez views as an aggressor and threat, are almost entirely due to his influence, and some say paranoia. In the modern day, 'power to the people' promised by the tyrant is more likely an excuse for the empowerment of the tyrant himself. Furthermore, another tactic for galvanising support is to find a scapegoat for the country's ills, and even a strawman enemy will do. For Chavez, this is the United States, while for the Greeks, presumably it was other nation states who were in competition (economic, territorial, and military) with their own. Hence patriotism is another distinguishing trait of populism or tyranny.

So how can tyranny be avoided? The state of Athens provides a model, because it answered attempts to establish a tyranny through reform. These reforms were headed in 594 BC by Solon, a man empowered by the state and with a mandate from both the aristocrats and commoners, who averted the political collapse of Athens. He abolished debt slavery, then prevalent among the poor farmers. Economically, he revived Athenian fortunes by promoting the new industry of olive oil production. And in place of the traditional aristocracy, he substituted a timocracy, a system of government where power and representation was in direct proportion to wealth. In this way, the middle class was accomodated in the middle rungs of power (minor offices in the council), the wealthiest could hold on to the highest rungs (such as the positions of archons), and the poorest were admitted to the assembly from which they had hitherto been barred. Legally, he also instituted a more moderate code of law and a court of appeal. But if Solon's reforms are compared to those characteristics of tyrants listed above, we can see some parallels: land reform, economic revival, (somewhat more) power to the people. The difference, though, was that Solon instituted his changes with the initial approval of all social classes, he did not hold on to office after his period of service, he did not play one socioeconomic class against another in a bid to gain influence and power, and his implementation of timocracy carefully sloped reform such as to let the aristocrats retain much of what they had been used to.

Of course, Solon was not entirely successful. In 546 BC, an aristocrat named Peisistratus (or Pisistratus), in the typical fashion, seized power, drove out some nobles, confisticated their lands, cozyed up to the middle class, instituted public works, and patronised culture. But Athens was thrown into turmoil again upon his death and his sons did not last long when they attempted to succeed him as tyrant. Eventually, another lawgiver in the fashion of Solon, named Cleisthenes, set in place several reforms to placate the discontent. Among the most important of his reforms was the introduction of deme membership as the criterion of citizenship of Athens. Previously, citizens were registered under their clans, so foreigners who had been newly granted citizenship under Solon's or Peisistratus's reforms were unable to register because they had no cultural or religious ties to these clans. Demes, then, were geographic units of the state which were the new basis of citizenship, rather than clans. As a result, sociocultural factors no longer could exclude foreigners from full citizenship and participation and removed a major source of discontent. This must rank as an early example of an immigration policy.

We can learn several things from the Athenian story. First, that to pre-empt revolution, one must remake oneself. In Venezuela, despite a democratic tradition dating from 1958 (AD!), the two major political parties before Hugo Chavez were plagued by corruption and resource mismanagement. Therefore, his promises to bridge the rich-poor gap and to root out the rot were widely welcomed. Had there been sufficiently vigorous self-renewal in the old system, perhaps his message would not have been necessary. Second, economic growth and solving income inequity are necessary for staying popular, and even promising these things might be enough to gain popularity at first. The formula for populist support has stayed the same through the millenia: land reform, public works to benefit the populace and generate employment, and a hint of Robin Hood. Both Peisistratus and Hugo Chavez work(ed) from the same manual. Third, not all reforms work, nor do their consequences always show up immediately. The problem of foreign immigration was caused in part by Solon's liberalising of Athenian citizenship law, but only solved by Cleisthenes almost a century later. Solon's reforms were not all accepted by every quarter of Athenian society, and could not prevent the tyranny of Peisistratus.

Finally, a note in passing about another populist leader, though recently deposed, Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand. Thaksin's power base was primarily among the rural poor, who voted in droves for his Thai Rak Thai party. They also welcomed "cheap medical care and debt relief, his nationalist platform and his contempt for the 'Bangkok elite'." (BBC profile) Among the businessmen (the equivalent, if one recalls, of the Greek middle class of tradesmen and artisans) he was popular for his businesslike style and the rebirth of the Thai economy after the 1990s doldrums. But he forgot a crucial point, that as a populist leader he was a class traitor, and despite being the richest man in Thailand, he could not give the impression that he or his family was gaining undue benefit from his position as Prime MInister, as the sale of his family's Shin Corp shares seemed to many Thais. Therefore, the opposition, including his disdained traditional elite, could muster enough support from those who felt betrayed, to overthrow him in a coup. He betrayed his own class by gaining support from the poor by attacking the elite, but betrayed the poor in turn by his family's apparent profiteering and so made his position untenable.